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NOTES
THE RULE AGAINST GENERALITY, VAGUENESS, AND
FAILURE TO ASSIGN ERROR IN RULE 4, SECTION 6
OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT RULES
I. INTIODUCTIO1
An invidious quality of rules and regulations is that the
simplest, clearest and most unambiguous of them can lay the
most lethal trap for the unwary. The apparent ease with which
such a rule can be followed and the simplicity of its requirements
often not only leads to the most cursory reading of it and, con-
sequently, nonrealization of hidden complexities, but may result
in its being disregarded altogether. Such has been the unhappy
case with South Carolina Supreme Court rule 4, section 6.
The rule sets out for the appealing litigant those elements which
must necessarily be contained in his exceptions to the proceedings
below in order for the court to consider his case. It reads:
Each exception must contain a concise statement of one
proposition of law or fact which this Court is asked to re-
view, and the same assignment of error should not be re-
peated. Each exception must contain within itself a com-
plete assignment of error, and a mere reference therein to
any other exception then or previously taken, or request to
charge will not be considered. The exceptions should 'not
be long or argumentative in form.'
Apparently plain on its face, devoid of technical terms, and
unchanged for decades, it leaves one to wonder why anyone
should fail to follow such a rule, particularly when one consid-
ers that failure to comply with it may result in the dismissal
of an otherwise meritorious appeal.
2
But if this paper were to be a simple admonishment to "fol-
low the rule" it would certainly have no place in this publica-
tion. The reasons behind the frequent breach of the rule3 must go
deeper. It is the opinion of this writer that aside from simply
disregarding the rule, which must account for many of the
1. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4 § 6.
2. See e.g., State v. Carter, 241 S.C. 262, 127 S.E.2d 882 (1962).
3. See the many cases cited by the annotator in Volume 15 of the S.C. CoDE
Axx. (1962) wherein the rule is set forth at page 146.
59
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cases, a large number of appellants fail to understand precisely
what the rule requires of them. The purpose of this paper is to
muster the significant decisions pertaining to the rule and by
presentation and analysis provide the practitioner with a handy
reference to the law in this area. Emphasis will be placed on the
later decisions.
I. PURPOSE OF TEM RUI
Basic to the appreciation and understanding of any rule is
a thorough knowledge of its function. Often the realization of
the exact purpose behind a rule of this type will solve most of
the problems of use and interpretation. In Simpson v. COX4 the
court sought to explain at length the intent of the rule:
It was intended to let the Court and opposing counsel see at
a glance what points of law or fact the appellant desires the
Court to review, and it is not fair, either to the Court or
opposing counsel, to allow an appellant, by the generality of
the language of his exceptions, to so mask the questions which
he will ask the Court to review, that they can be ascertained
only by the aid of his own explanation of the purpose con-
cealed in the generality of his language, thereby, perhaps,
also allowing them to serve as a cover for an afterthought.5
A more concise expression of this purpose was articulated by
the court when it said that it would not "grope in the dark" to
discover precisely on what the appellant was basing his appeal."
It becomes obvious that to comply with the rule the first thing
that an appellant should do is to read his exception as if he
were on the opposing side. If the exception, standing alone, con-
veys the precise proposition of law or fact upon which his issue
is taken, he has at least met the functional requirement of the
rule.
I. Tin RuLE AomxsT GE.Nn rALr, VAGuENEss,
AND INDEFIUTENESS
The three shortcomings listed in the title to this section have
long stood as the most objectionable characteristics of an improp-
erly drawn exception. The reason is clear. As pointed out in the
4. 95 S.C. 382, 79 S.E. 102 (1913).
5. Id. at 385-86, 79 S.E. at 103.
6. E.g., Solley v. Weaver, 247 S.C. 129, 146 S.E2d 164 (1966); Fruehauf
Trailer Co. v. McElmurray, 236 S.C. 141, 113 S.E.2d 756 (1960); Hewitt v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 201, 110 S.E2d 852 (1959).
[Vol. 20
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quote from Simpson v. Cox, supra, such an exception tends to
leave both the court and opposing counsel guessing as to the pre-
cise proposition of law on which the appellant is depending.
Formulation of a test for generality, however, is not so easy as
might be supposed. Cases such as Hewitt v. Reserve Life Isur-
ance Company,7 Elkins v. South Carolina & Georgia Railroad,8
and Shell v. Brown9 present no problem.
In Hewitt, the plaintiff had brought an action on an insur-
ance policy for payment of medical benefits, and defendant's
motions for a directed verdict non obstante veredicto and, alter-
nately, for a new trial had been denied. Defendants appealed on
the following two exceptions:
(1) That his honor Judge McGowen erred, it is respectfully
submitted, in refusing the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict non obstante veredicto.
(2) That his honor Judge McGowen erred... in refusing
the defendant's motion for a new trial.10
The error is patent. The legal grounds upon which the motion
was based are left purely to conjecture.
Not as obvious but equally insufficient was the exception tak-
en in Shell v. Brown: "His honor erred in failing to sustain the
demurrer, the error being the complaint fails to state a cause of
action as to the defendant."'"
How does the complaint fail to do so? Has an indispensable
element of the cause of action been omitted? Has the plaintiff
charged the defendant with the breach of a duty when none
existed? How can the opposing side know the nature of the chal-
lenge under these exceptions?
Brevity, of course, is no criterion on which to base the insuffi-
ciency of an exception. Consider the case of Hall v. Senn,-2 in
which an action was brought to set aside a tax deed some eight
years after the deed had changed hands. The special referee
found for the validity of the deed and found further that in
any event the plaintiffs were estopped by laches. On appeal
the circuit court found the deed invalid but held that no pre-
7. 235 S.C. 201, 110 S.E.2d 852 (1952).
8. 59 S.C. 1, 37 S.E. 20 (1900).
9. 243 S.C. 380, 134 S.E.2d 214 (1963).
10. 235 S.C. 201, 202, 110 S.E2d 852, 853 (1959).
Ii. 243 S.C. 380, 382, 134 S.E.2d 214, 215 (1963).
12. 242 S.C. 544, 131 S.E2d 700 (1963).
1968] No'zs
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judice had resulted from the referee's error since the court
agreed that the plaintiffs were estopped by laches. Two ex-
ceptions were taken to this ruling:
I. Exception is taken wherein the Court held that the sale
was improper and disagreed with the Referee's conclusion,
the specific error being that the Court did not consider this
prejudicial to the plaintiffs.
II. Exception is taken to the Court's opinion that the plain-
tiffs were guilty of laches and estoppel for not commencing
their action against the defendants for the purpose of re-
solving the controversy for a period of eight years from the
date of the deed from the Lexington County Forfeited Land
Commission to Vergie Clark and her husband, Neal B.
Clark.1 38
Well, what proposition of law or fact is relied upon? Was
the error by the referee prejudicial as a matter of fact or law?
The appellant has stated that the court did not think it was pre-
judicial, but merely to restate what the court has already said
and preface the statement with the words "the specific error be-
ing" can hardly be said to meet the rule's requirement that "each
exception must contain within itself a complete assignment of er-
ror" or the requirement that "each exception must contain a
concise statement ... of law or fact." As for the second excep-
tion, the appellants again failed to set out any legal or factual
ground for their exception. One might just as well appeal on the
ground that "the court was wrong."
These, and the many cases like them, are the easy ones. The
line becomes more difficult to discern, however, when the rule
is applied to the group of cases of which Wrenv v. Kirkland Dis-
tributing Company'4 is the most recent.
Wren was an action to recover $5,000 alleged to be due by
reason of a breach of contract to purchase a quantity of millet
seed. A counterclaim was entered for $3,000 alleged to be owed
by reason of respondent's failure to ship the seed as contracted
for. A verdict was directed against the buyer on the counter-
claim and the buyer, having had his motion for a new trial de-
nied, appealed from this decision complaining that the court
had erred:
13. Hall v. Senn, 242 S.C. 544, 546, 131 S.E2d 700, 701 (1963).
14. 156 S.E.2d 865 (S.C. 1967).
Vol. 20
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NoTEs
in not ordering a new trial on the grounds that the trial
Judge directed a verdict for the Respondent on Appellant's
counterclaim, striking said counterclaim from consideration
by the jury, when there was introduced sufficient unimpeach-
ed testimony to warrant consideration of the counterclaim to
the jury.15
The court held that the exception would not be considered since
it failed to meet the tests of the rule. But where does it fail? It
contains a concise statement of law; that is, as a matter of law
there was sufficient evidence to take the question to the jury.
It is not long or argumentative in form. The exception referred
to no other exception nor to any request to charge and, being the
first exception in the record, it certainly was not a mere repeti-
tion of a previous exception. The answer has to lie in the only
phrase of the rule left-"each exception must contain within
itself a complete assignment of error."
Assuming that the appellant's exception was not sufficiently
complete, the question becomes what else should it have contain-
ed? The court answered this question when it expressed its agree-
ment with counsel that the exception was "too general, vague,
and indefinite to be considered by this Court, because the excep-
tion contains no issue of fact upon which the counterclaim should
have been submitted to the jury."' In other words, the appellant
should have spelled out specifically which issues of fact pre-
sented in the transcript with regard to the counterclaim were in
sufficient doubt that the jury was needed to find the truth. In
support of this statement the court cited the decision in Solley
v. Weaver.17
Salley had presented the same question. In an action for per-
sonal injuries arising out of an automobile accident, the trial
judge had directed a nonsuit against the plaintiffs on the grounds
that there was no proof of negligence. Only one exception was
taken, to wit: "The Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion
for a nonsuit because there was more than one reasonable infer-
ence properly deducible from the testimony of negligence on the
part of the Defendant.' 8
15. Id. at 866.
16. Id.
17. 247 S.C. 129, 146 S.E.2d 164 (1966).
18. Solley v. Weaver, 247 S.C. 129, 131, 146 S.E.2d 164, 165 (1966).
19681
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This exception, too, was found to be too general, vague, and
indefinite. The explanation of the court was as follows:
We have held in many cases that every ground of appeal
ought to be so distinctly stated that the Court may at once
see the point which it is called upon to decide without
having to "grope in the dark" to ascertain the precise point
at issue. The object of an exception is to present some
distinct principle or question of law which the appellant
claims to have been violated by the Court in the trial of
the case from which the appeal is taken, and to present it
in such form that it may be properly reviewed. Hewitt v.
Reserve Life Ins. Go., 235 S.C. 201, 110 S.E.2d 852; Frue-
hauf Trailer Co. v. MeElmurray, 236 S.C. 141, 113 S.E.
2d 756.
It has been held that an exception requiring a review of
all the evidence is too general to be considered. Marshall 'v.
Creel, 44 S.C. 484, 22 S.E. 597; Weatherly v. Covington,
51 S.C. 55,28 S.E. 1; Elkins v. South Carolina & G.R.R. Co.,
59 S.C. 1, 37 S.E. 20. In the Elkins case, this Court said:
"'p*"'a good test whether an exception is too general is to
inquire whether it is so framed as to involve the necessity of
retrying the whole case just as it was presented to the
circuit judge. Subjecting this case to that test, it is very
manifest that the exception here is entirely too general."
In the case of FCX Co-op Service, Incorporated v. Bryant,
242 S.C. 511, 131 S.E.2d 702, Justice Brailsford, speaking
for this Court said:
" xceptions I, XXI, and XXII all charge error in direct-
ing a verdict for plaintiff; exception I, upon the ground
that more than one issue could be drawn from the testimony;
exception XXI, because the credibility of the testimony
was for the jury alone; and exception XXII, because the
evidence would support a verdict in favor of defendant on
his counterclaim. None of these exceptions points out any
issue of fact which appellant claims should have been sub-
mitted to the jury. They leave the court to search the entire
record and are too general to be considered."1 9
It should be clear from the foregoing that the general excep-
tion "that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury" and
19. Id. at 131-32, 146 S.E2d at 165.
[Vol. 20
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the various forms thereof will never be satisfactory. An appel-
lant must at least set out wlhicl issues of fact he claims to have
sufficiently proved. The justification for this position, as the
court said in the quote above, is that it is a waste of the
court's time if it must review the entire record. Functionally,
then, we can see that the emphasis in this class of cases is on
protection of the court rather than on protection of the parties
litigant.
If we accept the idea that the reason for the rule's insistence
on completeness is principally to protect the court and, secon-
darily, opposing counsel from generalities which take too much
time or may be impossible to clear up, then its application in
Winter v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company20 is a
little hard to accept. In that case the plaintiff, a receiver in
bankruptcy, alleged that the parties in receivership had been
put there due to a civil conspiracy between the defendants. The
defendant had moved that the complaint be made more definite
and certain in some particulars. The motion was refused by the
trial court. The defendant felt that the trial judge had improp-
erly refused to uphold that part of his motion which asked
that the plaintiffs be required to state dates, times, places, and
parties with regard to the alleged instances of conspiracy. The
exception read: "That His Honor erred in refusing to grant
Paragraph 6 of Appellant, Southern Equipment Sales Com-
pany's Motion to Make More Definite and Certain, the error
being that the Appellant was entitled to the information re-
quested therein."2'
The court held this to be too vague, general, and indefinite to
be considered. The court's explanation consisted simply of the
general language employed in the first quoted paragraph from
Solley v. Weaver, supra page 64 and is unsatisfactory. The
court does not have to "grope in the dark" as they assert. The
appellant clearly says that as a matter of law he was entitled to
have the requested information. The only explanation must lie
in the fact that he neglected to set out what information and to
what it referred. By merely referring to "Paragraph 6" of the
motion he violated the sanction against incompleteness explicit in
rule 4, section 6.
20. 240 S.C. 561, 126 S.E2d 724 (1962).
21. Record at 20, Winter v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 240 S.C. 561,
126 S.E2d 724 (1962).
NOTES1968]
7
White: The Rule Against Generality, Vagueness, and Failure to Assign Err
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
An elementary knowledge of South Carolina appellate pro-
cedure should make apparent the absurdity of this result. Rule 1
of the South Carolina Supreme Court requires that a certified
transcript of the record below shall be filed with the Clerk of
the Supreme Court within twenty days after the record is
agreed upon by the parties. Rule 4, section 1 requires that any
pleadings upon which grounds of appeal are based and the ex-
ceptions to the judgment below be included in this transcript.
The exceptions do not have to appear elsewhere.
In this case the exceptions were set out nowhere except in the
Transcript of Record, and in that same Transeript was reprint-
ed the "Paragraph 6" to which the exception referred 22 - as
it had to be under court rules. Since counsel for respondents did
not argue the point in their briefs23 it must be assumed that the
court studied the exception and found it wanting on their own
motion. Though it is true that the strict letter of the rule was not
complied with, it also is true that no possible prejudice could
have accrued either to the court or opposing counsel since any
doubts or questions about the exception could have been dis-
pelled by simply turning to another page of the document al-
ready in hand.
Two warnings to the draftsman are apparent from this case.
First, the failure of opposing counsel to attack the exception
is not conclusive that it will be considered. Second, the fact that
the infraction of the rule could not have resulted in any of the
evils which the rule is designed to prevent may be immaterial
to the court's decision to dismiss that ground of appeal.
Obviously, it is not possible to draw up definite rules or a
set of criteria whereby counsel can absolutely assure themselves
that the exceptions they have drafted will meet the test against
generality and vagueness implied in rule 4, section 6. But the
preceeding cases and comments should amply indicate that the
emphasis is on completeness. A doubt whether to include or ex-
clude certain details in an exception should be resolved in favor
of inclusion. This last recommendation is made in full recogni-
tion of the last sentence of the rule which forbids lengthy and
argumentative exceptions. Research has revealed no case where-
in an appeal was dismissed simply because an exception was too
22. Id. at 65.
23. Brief for Respondents, Winter v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 240
S.C. 561, 126 S.E.2d 724 (1962).
[Vol. 20
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long. All indications are that so long as only one proposition
of law or fact is presented in the exception, length alone will
not render it objectionable.
IV. EACH Exc IO MUST AssiGo EnuoR
The office of an exception is to assign error to the lower
court. Failing this, there is, of course, no need for an appeal,
the inference being that there was an error-free adjudication of
the parties' rights below. As basic as this seems it must be men-
tioned in light of the cases below. The reasons for failure to
comply with this requirement seem to be that the draftsman,
first, becomes so interested in setting out the law that he neg-
lects to show in what way the principle was violated and, second,
he attempts to argue the point rather than simply stating the
principle and the fact that it was breached. Two examples suf-
ficiently illustrate the point.
B'ownie Knitting Hills, Incorporated v. PCow24 was an action
on a New York judgment to which defendants asserted various
defenses and two counterclaims. Both counterclaims were struck
as being collateral attacks. Appeal was taken from this ruling
on the following exceptions:
1. Defendants' second Counterclaim does not constitute
a collaterial attack u p o n t h e Plaintiff's judgment, but
rather, is a direct attack upon Plaintiff's New York judg-
ment on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction and was pro-
cured through fraud.
2. Defendants' second Counterclaim did not exist at the
time of the New York action and could not have been assert-
ed in the New York action because the damages alleged
under the Second Counterclaim only arose when Plaintiff
committed the overt act of entering its spurious New York
judgment.
2 5
Several other exceptions were listed but the above are sufficient
for our purposes. The two reproduced here certainly seem to
be complete enough--except for one thing. In the language of
the court: "Examination of the exceptions reveals that none
imputes error to the lower Court but rather the exceptions are
24. 244 S.C. 422, 137 S.E.2d 450 (1964).
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mere statements of fact or propositions of law which in some
instances were not passed upon by the lower Court."
26
In Guledge v. Young 7 there were three personal injury ac-
tions arising out of an automobile-truck collision in Georgia.
A motion for a change of venue was granted and plaintiffs ap-
pealed on the following exception:
That his Honor... erred in granting the motion of the de-
fendants for a change of venue from Darlington County to
Anderson County.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR
1. That from the affidavits submitted by the defendants
in support of their said motion.., there are only two per-
sons... who may be called to testify on behalf of the de-
dendants, at the trial of this action, who reside in the State
of South Carolina. Both of these persons are employees,
servants, and agents of the defendants ....
2. That all of the affidavits submitted by the plaintiff
in opposition to the defendants' said motion for a change
of venue, were of 21 persons who reside in the State of South
Carolina, whose affidavits state that they reside consider-
ably closer to the Court House at Darlington, S.C., than
to the Court House at Anderson, S.C... *8
The court, besides finding the exception to be vague and in-
definite, characterized it this way:
The first of these [specifications] summarizes and mini-
mizes the showing made by the defendants in support of the
motion. The second numbered paragraph merely summarizes
the showing made in opposition to the defendants' motion
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs .... Nowhere
therein is a complete assignment of error set forth.29
In other words, instead of endeavoring to set out properly
errors made by the lower court, appellants had merely given a
short summary of their argument. There being no assignment
of error, there was nothing for the court to decide. It should be
26. Brownie Knitting Mills Inc. v. Picow, 244 S.C. 422, 424, 137 S.E.2d 450,
451 (1964).
27. 245 S.C. 88, 138 S.E.2d 833 (1964).
28. Records at 83-84, Gulledge v. Young, 245 S.C. 88, 138 S.E.Zd 833 (1964).
29. Gulledge v. Young, 245 S.C. 88, 90, 138 S.E.2d 833, 834 (1964).
[Vol. 2
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noted that in this last example the mere fact that the word
"error was used in various places in the exception was insuf-
ficient to meet the requirements of the rule.
V. APPLCATO oF THE RuIm
It would be misleading to leave an impression that every
breach of the requirements of rule 4, section 6 results in the
dismissal of an exception. In many cases the court has seen fit
to waive a technical fault and then to proceed to rule on the
questions raised. A study of these cases reveals, however, that
despite technical failure, a reading of the materials available
to both sides made it clear that a meritorious assignment of error
was made.
The court itself has made definite statements concerning this
liberal approach in cases like Brady v. Brady :30
"If such an examination of an exception as may be necessary
to disclose that it is framed in violation of the rule also
discloses that it clearly embraces a meritorious assignment
of prejudicial error, the court will ordinarily waive the
breach of the rule and consider the exception."'81
The policy is a bit overstated here. The sole exception in that
appeal was, "That his Honor, the trial judge, erred in sustain-
ing the oral demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that
the complaint did not state a cause of action, the error being
that the complaint does state a cause of action."
The court cannot be serious when they say that merely read-
ing this exception is sufficient to reveal a meritorious assign-
ment of error. (Compare the case of SheZZ v. Brown, supra.) The
point is made, in any event, that if the judgment below was a
result of prejudicial error which the appellant had attempted
to set out, the court would consider it.
Other cases demonstrate that the court is particularly liberal
when the appellant is a condemned man3 2 or is a fiduciary repre-
senting the interests of several persons.33
Despite the foregoing, it should be kept in mind that the court
has always made it clear that such exceptions to the enforcement
30. 222 S.C. 242, 72 S.E.2d 193 (1953).
31. Id. at 246, 72 S.E2d at 195, quoting from Jackson v. Carter, 128
S.C. 79, 86-87, 121 S.E. 559, 562 (1924).
32. See, e.g., State v. Griggs, 184 S.C. 304, 192 S.E. 360 (1937).
33. See, e.g., Wallace v. Tinunons, 232 S.C. 311, 101 S.E.2d 844 (1958).
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of the rule are a matter of grace. Further, it must be remember-
ed that the primary function of the rule is to insure that both
litigants and the court are under no illusions as to the issues
raised by the appeal. An exception which seeks to assign error
in general without giving fair warning of its grounds even when
read in conjunction with the remainder of the transcript will
doubtless be dismissed regardless of errors committed below
which could be gleaned from the record.
J. SPRATT WIE=
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